Dissociative amnesia: Methodological limits, conceptual limits, and alternative explanations

The 1990s witnessed a strong opposition between researchers and psychologists who supported the idea of repressed memories and their skeptical counterparts, who claimed that such a concept was not supported by scientific evidence. The former supported the idea that traumatic memories could be pushed beyond the boundaries of consciousness. The latter argued that ordinary mechanisms of memory functioning (e.g., false memories, ordinary forgetting) were more likely to explain why some people could suddenly remember traumatic events for which they had no memory until then (i.e., recovered memories). Today more commonly referred to as dissociative amnesia and included in the 5th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the belief in repression is still widely used and disseminated by psychologists, even though evidence of its existence is still unconvincing. In this article, we propose a critical analysis of the concept of dissociative amnesia. To do this, we review the evidence adduced by its advocates and develop their methodological and conceptual limitations. We also propose alternative mechanisms to explain the phenomenon of recovered memories: false memories, reappraisal of traumatic events, avoidance strategies, non-disclosure of abuse, etc. Finally, with regard to therapeutic but also judicial issues (i.e., judicial expertise), we conclude with a call for caution addressed to the scientific and clinical community.